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The Aesthetic Dimension
of Wittgenstein’s Later Writings
William Day
When a collection of remarks fromWittgenstein’s journals was published
in 1977 as Vermischte Bemerkungen (Culture and Value),1 Georg Henrik
von Wright, the editor, explained the nature of the collection this way:
In the manuscript material left by Wittgenstein there are numerous notes
which do not belong directly with his philosophical works although they are
scattered among the philosophical texts. Some of these notes are autobiogra-
phical, some are about the nature of philosophical activity, and some concern
subjects of a general sort, such as questions about art or about religion. (CV ix)
Readers of von Wright’s description of Culture and Value who went on to
read Culture and Value itself came to wonder eventually, of course,
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whether any set of remarks described as “scattered among [Wittgenstein’s]
philosophical texts” but “which do not belong directly with his philosophical
works” was in fact a null set. (Why would Wittgenstein “scatter” these
remarks among his “philosophical texts” unless they were, in fact, part of
“his philosophical works”—or, at a minimum, part of his philosophical
work?) But I want to take note of a diﬀerent, if less trenchant, implication
of von Wright’s description: these collected remarks can be further deli-
neated, he oﬀers, as “autobiographical” or else “about the nature of philoso-
phical activity” or concerning “subjects of a general sort, such as questions
about art or about religion.”
The diﬃculty of putting this claim into practice appears when one
runs up against remarks from Culture and Value such as the following:
Scientiﬁc questions may interest me, but they never really grip me. Only
conceptual & aesthetic questions have that eﬀect on me. (CV 91e)
The queer resemblance between a philosophical investigation . . . and one
in aesthetics. (E.g. what is bad about this garment, how it should be, etc..)
(CV 29g)
Is the ﬁrst of these notes autobiographical, or is it about the nature of
philosophical activity? Is the second note about the nature of philosophical
activity, or is it concerned with the way we talk about art? VonWright may
have shared our sense that the answer in each case must be “Both—and
more.”He says he rejected the idea of arranging the remarks in Culture and
Value according to topics treated because it “would probably give an
impression of artiﬁciality” (CV ix). But if we can now grant that topical
segregation of Wittgenstein’s already segregated remarks from Culture and
Valuewould yield something worse than a mere impression of the artiﬁcial,
what deliberate criss-crossing of autobiography and method and aesthetics,
as I attempt here, can promise something better?
The following remarks promise nomore than a reorientation, but they are
an attempt to elucidate the aesthetic dimension in Wittgenstein’s later
thought. That one can ﬁndmaterial relevant to aesthetics in his later writings
(not only in Culture and Value) has been recognized for over a half-century.
My interest here, however, is not in applyingWittgenstein’s thought to some
traditional aesthetic problems, but in reading some ofWittgenstein’s remarks
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through the lens of his aesthetic concerns, hoping thereby to gain a better un-
derstanding of his philosophical purpose. I hope to show the extent to which
meaning and judgment in aesthetics ﬁgure inWittgenstein’s later conception
of language, particularly in his conception of how philosophymight go about
explaining, if not justifying, the ordinary functioning of language.
My remarks fall into three parts. In the ﬁrst, I draw attention to some
biographical and textual considerations that will help us measure the extent
to which Wittgenstein’s life with music is embedded in his later writings.
In the second part, I advance these considerations by outlining the con-
nection among Wittgenstein’s discussions of (1) the ideal of philosophical
clarity or perspicuity sought in his later writings, (2) our attempts to give
clarity to our aesthetic experiences by wording them, and (3) the clarifying
experience of the dawning of an aspect, which Wittgenstein pictures as the
perception of an internal relation. By then examining, in part three,
Wittgenstein’s use of “internal relation” from the Tractatus to his later
writings,2 I come to challenge the understanding of Wittgenstein’s
appeals to grammar as an appeal to something given (e.g., to a set of
grammatical rules). While something like this challenge has received
increasing notice over the past 20 years,3 I develop that challenge by
making clear the lesson that aesthetic considerations bring to one’s reading
of Wittgenstein’s later conception of language. That lesson is, in a sentence,
2 I will argue that in the period between the Tractatus and the “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough,”
Wittgenstein changes his view on internal relations from a logical one to, call it, an aesthetic one.
3 See, for example, Steven Aﬀeldt, “The Ground of Mutuality: Criteria, Judgment, and Intelligibility in
Stephen Mulhall and Stanley Cavell,” European Journal of Philosophy 6:1 (April 1998): 1–31 (Aﬀeldt
1998); Stephen Mulhall, “The Givenness of Grammar: A Reply to Steven Aﬀeldt,” in the same issue,
32–44 (Mulhall 1998); Mulhall, “Stanley Cavell’s Vision of the Normativity of Language: Grammar,
Criteria, and Rules,” Stanley Cavell, ed. Richard Eldridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 79–106 (Mulhall 2003); Edward Minar, “The Philosophical Signiﬁcance of Meaning-
Blindness,” Seeing Wittgenstein Anew, ed. William Day and Victor J. Krebs (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010) (Minar 2010). The debate I see myself joining is thus in part a debate over how
to read Stanley Cavell reading Wittgenstein; but that debate was from the ﬁrst a debate over how
Wittgenstein read the unutterable systematicity of human language. In marrying that debate with
considerations gleaned from aesthetics and fromwhat one might call the unutterable meaning of music,
it will be clear to some that my remarks continue to repay a debt to Cavell, particularly to his early essays
on aesthetics collected in Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1969, 1976; updated edition, 2002) (Cavell 1969, 1976).
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thatWittgensteinian appeals to grammatical criteria should be understood as
modeled by the form of justiﬁcation found in our conversations about art.
1.1 Music and Understanding Wittgenstein’s
“Book”
One place to begin to sound the depth of Wittgenstein’s concern in his
later writings with what he calls at one point “aesthetic matters”4 is
with a remark of his that links his deep involvement with music to his
well-documented fear or conviction that his teaching would fall on deaf
ears and before blind eyes. At the time he was at work on the remarks on
aspect-seeing, Wittgenstein told his friend Maurice Drury, “It is impos-
sible for me to say in my book one word about all that music has meant in
my life. How then can I hope to be understood?”5 Of course it is possible to
make too much of this remark, but one should not be so impressed by that
fact that one overlooks the danger of making too little of it. For its tone of
despair, to mention its most obvious feature, asks us to take it seriously,
however in the end that is to be done.6 I assume that a serious reading will
not direct us to fasten on those remarks in Wittgenstein’s later writings that
4 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1958), 202h (Wittgenstein 1958b), hereafter cited as PI followed by the remark
number or, for citations from Part II of the Investigations, by page number and a letter indicating
the position of the remark on that page—for example, “193a” for the ﬁrst remark on page 193, etc.
5M. O’C. Drury, “Conversations with Wittgenstein,” in Rhees, ed., Recollections of Wittgenstein
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 160 (Drury 1984).
6 Joachim Schulte quotes Wittgenstein’s remark to Drury in the “Introduction” to hisWittgenstein: An
Introduction, trans. William H. Brenner and John F. Holley (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 14 (Schulte
1992), placing it at the beginning of a section titled “Personality.” Not surprisingly, given that
placement, the immediate lesson Schulte draws from it is purely biographical: music was an “important
part in his life” and “a determining factor in thewayWittgenstein interactedwithmany of his friends and
acquaintances” (ibid.). It is true that Wittgenstein’s remark, as remembered by Drury, could be read as
saying that his life withmusic is important (only) to understanding him. But if that is what one takes it to
say, then one must account for the fact (an implication of this particular voicing of despair) that
Wittgensteinwould care to place the singular hope of his being understood onwhat is, bymost accounts,
a work of philosophy.
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allude to an experience of music. For insofar as he does speak to his life with
music in these writings, it is not clear how we could understand there being
a diﬃculty in his speaking to it. Wittgenstein’s remark to Drury would seem
to announce: Nothing of what I write is untouched by the fact that my life
has been, among all else, a life with music. Should we understand this to
mean that every remark in the Investigations speaks—or rather fails com-
pletely in each instance to speak—somehow to a life with music? It seems
we could come to believe that nothing of the book breaks faith with that
experience.
How should we characterize that experience? Consider the following,
representative part of the public record of Wittgenstein’s life with music.
He learned to play clarinet when he was in his 30s, and thereafter played on
occasion informally with others. We are told that he took great care over
the exact manner of performance, but whether his concern was unusual or
straightforwardly musicianly is not clear. He was fond of the music of
Brahms and Josef Labor, both of whom had been personal friends of his
family when he was growing up. He had little interest in or patience for the
music of modern composers—which should be understood to include
Mahler no less than Schoenberg; but on at least one occasion he showed
an interest, or more a curiosity, in jazz. He was by all accounts an excellent
whistler: he would whistle Schubert songs while his friend David Pinsent,
to whose memoryWittgenstein dedicated the Tractatus, accompanied him
on the piano. He grew up in a family that had a wealth of musical talent.
His mother was an outstanding sight reader; his brother Paul was a concert
pianist; and his brother Hans was composing music when he was 4 years
old, the age at which Wittgenstein, we are told, began to talk.7
While these particulars and anecdotes are intriguing, and despite a
continuing fascination with their cultural background—with ﬁn de
siècle Vienna and the breaking apart of empires—what we have here
is not an exceptional life with music, a life with music unlike any other.
(What would the public record of such a life look like? Perhaps it
7 For facts cited in this paragraph, see Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius
(New York: Free Press, 1990), 8, 11–14, 78, 213, 240 (Monk 1990); Allan Janik and Stephen
Toulmin, Wittgenstein’s Vienna (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), 175–76 (Janik and
Toulmin 1973).
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would look like Mozart’s; perhaps like Helen Keller’s: “I am blind—yet
I see; I am deaf—yet I hear.”) Despite its melodramatic expression, or
say its transcendental claim, its gesture in the direction of all that music
has meant in his life, Wittgenstein’s remark is not best taken to be
singling out his experience with music as opposed to, say, mine, my
deeply felt but unexceptional life with music. Yet neither is his an
ordinary life with music. We cannot imagine Wittgenstein’s particular
despair as belonging to just anyone.
I said above that takingWittgenstein’s remark seriously will not direct us
to turn single-mindedly to his remarks on music. But it would be equally
unwise to overlook the several remarks in the Investigations that do draw
connections to music. I count over 30 such remarks in its 232 pages. And
there are dozens of others in the Nachlass from this period when
Wittgenstein was at work on what he described to Drury only as “my
book.” Indeed, as one follows the suggestion that a life with music informs
the later writings, one can be struck by the often pivotal locations of those
remarks in the Investigations that speak to music. They belong to paths of
thought that include further remarks about the sense in which we can and
cannot describe sounds (PI §78) and smells (PI §610), what pictures tell us
(PI §523), what it means to understand a picture or a drawing (PI §526),
how we lead others to comprehend a poem (PI §533), what goes on in
reading a poem with and without feeling (PI 214h), and, of course,
what it means that we can see and hear things in a particular way (PI II.
xi passim) or in a particular sense (PI §534) or with a particular phrasing
(PI 202k). By now, I hope, the wonder is not whether we can take
Wittgenstein’s remark to Drury seriously, but whether we can account for
what I believe is a not uncommon experience in reading the Investigations:
the sense that one is discovering its aesthetic import, as if the remarks
about music and pictures and poetry came upon one by surprise, as if the
presence of these remarks had always been missed.8 This experience is no
8 I ﬁnd this experience, and the argument of this paper generally, not incompatible with Norton
Batkin’s observations about the “seeing-as” remarks in PI II.xi, that they “are not in the ﬁrst place
about matters of aesthetics” and that “if we ﬁnd signiﬁcance for aesthetics inWittgenstein’s remarks
in PI II.xi, we ﬁnd it by analogy.” See Norton Batkin, “Aesthetic Analogies,” Seeing Wittgenstein
Anew, 23, 25 (Batkin 2010).
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doubt tied to another which one can have in reading Wittgenstein’s
“Lectures on Aesthetics,”9 namely the sense that much of what is said
there is only tangentially related to what we tend to call aesthetics, so that
one forgets that one is reading lectures on aesthetics.10 These complemen-
tary possibilities of forgetting suggest to me the diﬃculty in mastering the
extent to which Wittgenstein’s work treats the aesthetical, as it treats the
ethical,11 not as a separate discipline within philosophy but as somehow
integral to the task of thinking philosophically—or as Wittgenstein prefers
to say, perspicuously (PI §122). To take Wittgenstein’s remark to Drury
seriously now asks that one bethinks oneself how a life with music—a
deeply felt if unexceptional life with music—ﬁgures in the pursuit of
philosophical perspicuity.
1.2 Perspicuous Representation, Aesthetic
Descriptions, and Aspect-Seeing
To bring out this connection between the aesthetical and the philoso-
phically perspicuous, (1) I will ﬁrst say a word about Wittgenstein’s
characterization of his method as one of perspicuous representation.
(2) I will then describe how the philosophical task of perspicuous
representation relates to the kinds of critical descriptions called for
by experiences of music. Lastly, (3) I will compare these to
Wittgenstein’s description of the dawning of an aspect as the percep-
tion of an internal relation.
9Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. Cyril
Barrett (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), hereafter cited as
LC (Wittgenstein 1972).
10One of Wittgenstein’s ﬁrst remarks, for example, is that one learns which words in a foreign
tribe correspond to “good” or “ﬁne” by looking for food or toys (LC 2).
11 See Stanley Cavell, “Declining Decline: Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Culture,” in This New Yet
Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after Wittgenstein (Albuquerque, N.M.: Living Batch
Press, 1989), 40 (Cavell 1989).
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Philosophical Clarity and Perspicuous Representation
In the remark where Wittgenstein emphasizes the importance to his
method of a perspicuous representation (PI §122), he explains that such
an account “produces just that understanding which consists in ‘seeing
connections’. Hence the importance of ﬁnding and inventing intermedi-
ate cases.” What kind of understanding is Wittgenstein describing here?
We come to know through the course of reading the Investigations
what he means by “ﬁnding and inventing intermediate cases”
(Zwischengliedern, “connecting links”): they are instances of language
use (of language-games) summoned as “objects of comparison which are
meant to throw light on the facts of our language” (PI §130) at moments
of philosophical darkness, or when one is most in danger of succumbing
to one or another form of philosophical error. Where Wittgenstein ﬁnds
an intermediate link, it may counter a tendency to view the occasions of
use of a particular word unvaryingly—the tendency, for example, to
imagine that “I know . . . ” always implies being able to say or describe
what one knows (cf. PI §78). Elsewhere Wittgenstein will invent an
intermediate link, not so much between existing occasions of use as
between existing human or even biological forms of life, say between
human and animal, to counter the tendency to view certain words or
concepts as fundamental (cf. PI 230b). Thus Wittgenstein asks his
readers on occasion to imagine a language use as natural at some time
in our primitive past, or for creatures diﬀering from us in some impor-
tant respect, or natural to us were certain facts about us somehow
diﬀerent. The builders in PI §2 are introduced in this way;12 and
Wittgenstein’s conceptual investigation of the aspect-blind is another
instance of such an invented intermediate case.13 Wittgenstein calls the
12PI §2: “That philosophical concept of meaning [i.e., the one Wittgenstein sees pictured in the
quotation from Augustine that opens the Investigations] . . . is the idea of a language more primitive
than ours. Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right.”
13PI 213f: “The question now arises: Could there be human beings lacking in the capacity to see
something as something—and what would that be like? What sort of consequences would it
have?—Would this defect be comparable to color-blindness or to not having absolute pitch?—We
will call it ‘aspect-blindness’—and will next consider what might be meant by this.”
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making of these intermediate cases “the construction of ﬁctional con-
cepts” (CV 85a) and “inventing ﬁctitious natural history” (PI 230a).
It is not so obvious how laying before us these ﬁndings and inventions will
produce “just that understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’.”
For saying that an understanding consists in seeing connections does not
straightforwardly exclude very much of anything we understand by “under-
standing.” Yet Wittgenstein asserts that a perspicuous representation, the
concept of which “is of fundamental signiﬁcance for us,” has the eﬀect of
producing “just that understanding.” It will help, in unpacking this claim, to
turn to the original context of the remark that became PI §122, since there
Wittgenstein speciﬁes at least one sort of understanding hemeans to exclude.
The remark on perspicuous representation dates from the early 1930s
and concludes 10 pages of consecutive commentary on Frazer’s The Golden
Bough.14 Wittgenstein’s aim in that commentary is to distinguish his new
method of responding to philosophical puzzles from what he ﬁnds objec-
tionable in Frazer’s enterprise of explaining magical and religious practices
by seeking to establish their historical origins. Wittgenstein writes,
The historical explanation, the explanation as an hypothesis of develop-
ment, is only one way of assembling the data—of their synopsis. It is just as
possible to see the data in their relation to one another and to embrace them
in a general picture without putting it in the form of an hypothesis about
temporal development….
“And so the chorus points to a secret law” one feels like saying to Frazer’s
collection of facts. I can represent this law, this idea, by means of an evolu-
tionary hypothesis, . . . but also by means of the arrangement of its factual
content alone, in a ‘perspicuous’ representation.
There follows in reverse order two short paragraphs that constitute the
last two-thirds of PI §122:15
The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental signiﬁcance
for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. . . .
14Wittgenstein, “Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough,” in Philosophical Occasions: 1912–1951, ed.
James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1993), 115–55,
hereafter cited as PO (Wittgenstein 1993).
15Here I substitute Anscombe’s more familiar translation in PI for Beversluis’s translation in PO
wherever the German in the two versions is identical, so as to bring out that identity.
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This perspicuous representation produces just that understanding
which consists in ‘seeing connections.’ Hence the importance of ﬁnding
intermediate cases.
And the remarks on Frazer conclude,
But an hypothetical connecting link should in this case do nothing but
direct the attention to the similarity, the relatedness, of the facts. As one
might illustrate an internal relation of a circle to an ellipse by gradually
converting an ellipse into a circle; but not in order to assert that a certain
ellipse actually, historically, had originated from a circle (evolutionary
hypothesis), but only in order to sharpen our eye for a formal connection.
(PO 132–33; Wittgenstein’s emphasis throughout)
The goal of a perspicuous representation is thus distinguished from an
understanding of “the facts” (e.g., concerning ritual practices) which pro-
poses a hypothesis to explain their interconnectedness (e.g., that these ritual
practices are, as they are for Frazer, a superstitious attempt to do what
greater experience has taught us to do by means of full-ﬂedged scientiﬁc
inquiry).16 For Wittgenstein, seeing the connections among the facts is the
goal: philosophical perspicuity requires not that you ﬁnd the causal con-
nections of the facts collected and set down, but that you see how the facts
connect to you, or sit with you, how your response to them is telling of you.
Philosophical perspicuity takes the form not of a demonstration, something
on which one can build, but of a way of looking, something which must
itself be built up (that is, practiced, gone over, repeatedly reconstructed).
But there is something curiously unguarded in the younger
Wittgenstein’s claim—repeated in PI §122—that a perspicuous repre-
sentation “produces”17 that keen seeing of connections that characterizes
16 The thought that a philosophical inquiry is not a scientiﬁc (empirical) one, that the urge to
provide an explanation must give way to the task of description, and that “description” here means
a laying out or arrangement of what we already know, ﬁnds its most concentrated expression in
the Investigations at §109.
17Wittgenstein’s “vermittelt” is perhaps not as strong as Anscombe’s “produces” (“mediates” seems
closer); but neither is it hedged (“vermittelt etwa das Verständnis” or something similar).
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philosophical understanding. For must it produce this in everyone?
Couldn’t someone fail to see? The unguardedness is further apparent
in this earlier version where Wittgenstein calls what one sees an “internal
relation” (as between ellipse and circle). An internal relation—whether
this describes a relation between pictures18 or among the structures of
propositions (TLP 5.131, 5.2)—is something that the early
Wittgenstein insists can be shown but not said (TLP 4.122). So one
question of interpretation, in assessing Wittgenstein’s remarks on Frazer,
is whether he thinks that my seeing an ellipse changing into a circle
means that I must be on the way to seeing their “internal relation”
(“sharpen our eye for a formal connection”). And a related question,
in considering the method of the Investigations, is whether Wittgenstein
thinks that my seeing, for example, a list illustrating the multiplicity of
things we do with words (PI §23) or seeing two quite diﬀerent schema
for reading a table (PI §86) entails that I be on the way to “seeing the
connections” among our words. This second question is particularly
pressing, for what I see there in the list or schema(if I see it) is that
these connections among our words are all that connects—that is, that
what holds language together is not to be gained by some philosophical
analogue to Frazer’s hypothesizing.
Critical Descriptions and the Experience of Music
The same distinction just outlined—between a knowing whose goal is
seeing the connections and a knowing that proposes an historical or
causal explanation of the connections—is central toWittgenstein’s descrip-
tions of how we convey our experiences of music. Here the relevant
remarks appear in Wittgenstein’s various discussions of what it is to
understand music and what it is to explain to someone what one under-
stands in understanding a musical passage. Let me summarize the four
18Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (Atlantic
Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1961), 4.014 (Wittgenstein 1961), hereafter cited as TLP followed
by the proposition number.
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lessons that I draw from these passages:19 (1) We explain what we under-
stand in understanding a musical passage by coming up with certain
comparisons or associations (connections). We might make a gesture to
express what we hear, or we might say “These two [symphonic] ideas stand
to each other not as blood relations, but as man & wife” (CV 39c). (2)
Insofar as these comparisons can be justiﬁed (PI §527), it is not a justiﬁca-
tion which the other personmust accept; we cannot give conclusive reasons
(propose a causal connection) for our making them, for example by noting
something the composer said about what the passage is supposed to
represent (CV 79c). (3) The comparisons that I come up with in describing
a musical passage can be of interest to me no less than to someone else
(LC 32). I may even begin with the feeling that I “don’t know my way
about” with the music (cf. PI §123) but then, when the association occurs
to me, say: Now I understand (LC 37).20 (4) Nevertheless, when I oﬀer
comparisons as a way of explaining what I understand in understanding
a musical passage, I am not claiming that they are what I understand, as if
forming them were the criterion of that understanding.21 And thus my
intention in oﬀering the associations is not to put these associations in the
other person’s head. For in that case it would do just as well for her to acquire
the associations independent of hearing this stretch of music (LC 34, 36).22
19 It is not part of my concern whether the following remarks fail to discriminate between
descriptions of music and descriptions of painting or dance or architecture. It may matter in a
way that goes beyond what I have written here—indeed, I suspect it does matter—that it was a life
with music and not, for example, a life with architecture or poetry that Wittgenstein despaired his
being unable to say anything about. But whether, if it matters further, we should attribute this
to music’s abstractness or purity or directness, is not my immediate concern to say. Nor am I
interested in criticizing Wittgenstein for his fairly scanty enumeration of what can be said to
convey an understanding of a musical passage. It is enough for my purpose that the examples he
does give are felt as accurate, recognizable as expressive of a life with music.
20 See also Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), 167,
hereafter cited as BB (Wittgenstein 1958a).
21 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1974; reprint, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), III:37 (p. 79)
(Wittgenstein 1974).
22Wittgenstein adds that producing associations could be our interest in art (his example is poetry)
were we or our culture diﬀerent (LC 34). What this suggests about the nature of art, I take it, is
that a question perpetually worth asking is whether we or our culture are on the way to becoming,
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My intention is rather to get her to hear what I hear. And since I know too
well that the comparisons I oﬀer only hint at this (cf. PI 183b), I might
describe my intention as one of getting her to hear what I hear before the
connection ismade (cf. PI §§125–6). Understanding amusical passage is not
a matter of “having” (suﬀering) associations (connections); understanding
music is following it. (Admittedly, however, I will look to what she says and
does as themusic is playing, or afterwards—and in general, to what I know of
her—if asked to say whether I think she understands a musical passage.)
You may already see how understanding music bears on Wittgenstein's
proposal that the philosophical project is one of seeing connections. Grant
that the musical association I give voice to in response to a musical passage is
not one I simply choose on a whim, but that it is forced on me, or from me
(cf. PI 178h, 215a). Do we feel inclined here, as with the ellipse and the
circle, to say that there is an “internal relation” between this musical passage
and my description of it? I think that we are less inclined to speak of an
internal relation here, and that our disinclination is not unrelated to the fact
that some other person may well fail to acknowledge this relation, may well
fail to understand me. The positivist inheritors of the Tractatus would say
simply that this is because my description of the musical passage—e.g.,
“Don’t you see, this is as if a conclusion were being drawn” (PI §527; cf.
PI 182e)—is nonsense. Yet of music Wittgenstein expresses the conviction,
as he does of the self-aﬃrmed nonsense of the Tractatus, that it can
teach us something as well as give us pleasure (CV 42d; TLP Preface).
And he is willing to speak of something in discussions of aesthetic associa-
tions as “decisive” (PI 219b). What should we make of the fact (if it is one)
that we are less inclined here to speak of an internal relation?
The Case of the Dawning of an Aspect
Wittgenstein emphasizes a structure of “seeing an internal relation” at a
crucial juncture in the discussion of aspect-seeing in Part II of the
Investigations. His central task over the ﬁrst half of this discussion is to
or have already become, diﬀerent in just this sense. And I take it that this change would be felt by
some (including Wittgenstein) to be an irredeemable loss.
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characterize the odd mix of features in our expressions of the dawning of an
aspect, the sense that seeing an aspect is “a case of both seeing and thinking”
or “an amalgam of the two” (PI 197h). After Wittgenstein rejects the
suggestion that it just is an amalgam (PI 211e), he oﬀers the following:
The colour of the visual impression corresponds to the colour of the object
(this blotting paper looks pink to me, and is pink)—the shape of the visual
impression to the shape of the object (it looks rectangular to me, and is
rectangular)—but what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a
property of the object, but an internal relation between it and other
objects. (PI 212a)
The internal relation among the relevant objects in this context is not
something prepared for us, as by a perspicuous representation or setting
out. The internal relation simply dawns in the seeing. Wittgenstein says
the internal relation is “what I perceive.”
Before considering the implications of this for our understanding both
of aspect-seeing and of philosophical perspicuity, I note that the perti-
nence of Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspect-seeing to a consideration of
his philosophical method makes itself felt in two distinct ways. First,
Wittgenstein approaches the topic of aspect-seeing with the same goal of
clariﬁcation that he claimed as central to our understanding of (Frazer’s
facts about) ritual practices. Immediately after Wittgenstein introduces
the concept of “noticing an aspect” in this section of the Investigations, he
draws the distinction between an interest in its causes (an interest which
he ascribes to psychologists) and “our” interest in “the concept and its
place among the concepts of experience” (PI 193d–e). Here again, his
interest is in discovering conceptual connections the seeing of which
achieves a clearing of the philosophical fog. But further—coming to the
second point of pertinence—in this instance the concept of aspect-seeing
identiﬁes an experience which is itself a seeing of connections. To study its
connections to other concepts is thus to study the conceptual connections
of the concept of seeing connections, the concept of understanding that
Wittgenstein sets out to convey in his later writing. This aﬃnity between
subject and method suggests strongly that aspect-seeing is more than a
mere ﬁgure for the experience of sudden philosophical understanding.
16 W. Day
Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspect-seeing should itself be seen as a med-
itation on the possibility and conditions of his philosophical procedure.23
1.3 Aspect-Seeing and Seeing an Internal
Relation
Let us return to Wittgenstein’s saying that when I see an aspect dawn
what I perceive is an internal relation. An internal relation between
what? In an aspect-dawning experience it will be the relation between
that which is before me—say, Jastrow’s duck-rabbit—and something
not (necessarily) before me—say, rabbits, with their rabbit ears, rabbit
noses, rabbit eyes, etc. If I have been seeing the duck-rabbit simply as
the picture of a duck, my experience in the dawning of an aspect is that
of suddenly seeing the one (rabbits) in the other (the duck-rabbit).24
When we compare this experience to that of seeing the internal relation
or formal connection that Wittgenstein is describing in his remarks on
Frazer, or in the gradual conversion of an ellipse into a circle, it seems that
here in the dawning of an aspect more is dependent on me, as it were. One
could say that with aspect-dawning experiences the relation is more
obviously something that I bring to the table (since at least one of the
“objects” is). Still, that I perceive a relation need not be telling of me; my
interest in it need not entail the sense that it is mine, as we found it did
with the musical associations I form. That I perceive a relation does not
23 For an elaboration and defense of the idea that “the aspect-seeing remarks in the Investigations
oﬀer . . . both an extended allegory of how to appropriate or receive the text of the Investigations, and a
detailed working-out of the vicissitudes that, invariably or constitutionally, one ﬁnds along the way,”
see Victor J. Krebs and my “Introduction: Seeing Aspects in Wittgenstein,” in Seeing Wittgenstein
Anew, 4–11 (Day and Krebs 2010) (from which the passage just quoted is taken), and (in the same
volume) my “Wanting to Say Something: Aspect-Blindness and Language,” 220–24 (Day 2010).
24 Richard Wollheim famously draws a distinction between seeing-as (seeing one object as a
diﬀerent object) and seeing-in (seeing what is pictured in a picture, seeing what it represents);
see Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects: An Introduction to Aesthetics (New York: Harper &
Row, 1968) (Wollheim 1968). In speaking of seeing rabbits (a rabbit) “in” the duck-rabbit I am
not trying to muddy Wollheim’s distinction but, rather, to bring out that Wittgenstein’s descrip-
tion of aspect-dawning as the perception of an internal relation is agnostic about this distinction.
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seem particularly telling, for example, with the switch of aspects of the
duck-rabbit, at least not once I become familiar with such drawings. It may
be more telling were I unable to make it switch where you and most others
could. And it may be more telling where the object of perception is more
ambiguous (a cloud, a Rorschach test), as it would be telling, and trou-
bling, were I to discover that I could no longer see any ﬁgures in clouds, the
adroitness of childhood possibly abandoning me, here as elsewhere.
But now, are we inclined, as Wittgenstein would seem to be, to call
what we perceive in aspect-dawning experiences an “internal relation?”
I think that we are most inclined to say this when we are thinking of
gestalt-ﬁgures like Jastrow’s duck-rabbit. And our inclination here seems
to be strengthened by the peculiar unambiguity of these ambiguous
ﬁgures, the feature of there being, one wants to say, exactly two ways
of seeing them. Even when we ﬁnd that there are multiple ways of seeing
a ﬁgure, as Wittgenstein seems to discover between his remark about the
schematic cube pictured at TLP 5.5423 (where he imagines only two
ways of seeing it) and his remark about the similar rectangular prism
pictured at PI 193f (where the list of “several” ways of seeing it could go
on indeﬁnitely), we are still inclined to say with the earlier Wittgenstein,
“we really see two [three, four, . . . ] diﬀerent facts” (my emphasis). The
picture anticipates, or provides for, the very possibilities we see. It is this
feature of self-presentation or transparency that such ﬁgures, despite
their ambiguity, share with unambiguous pictures (whether “picture
objects”—such as the “picture-face” at PI 194c—or full-ﬂedged pic-
tures). More importantly, it is this aspect of our life with pictures which
makes that life appear to oﬀer the perfect solution to the problem of
meaning, in the guise of the Tractarian picture theory. What seems
given in such ﬁgures is the very method by which we are to read them—
and so, too, the signiﬁcance that they carry.
But when Wittgenstein turns to the example of a child seeing a chest as
a house (PI 206e–g),25 or of a musical theme played at successively slower
tempos until the listener exclaims “Now at last it’s a [march, dance, . . . ]”
25 “And if you knew how to play this game, and, given a particular situation, you exclaimed with
special expression ‘Now it’s a house!’—you would be giving expression to the dawning of an aspect.”
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(PI 206i),26 I think we are less inclined to say that these possible relations
are internal to those objects. And when he introduces related experiences,
such as my hearing the plaint in a plaintive melody (PI 209f) or the
seriousness of a tune (PI 210b), and then moves on to consider “experi-
encing the meaning of a word” (PI 210c, 214d and following) or our
“attachment” to our words which we could imagine other human beings
lacking (PI 218g), we are not very far from descriptions of our under-
standing of a musical passage. And yet Wittgenstein nowhere says that
musical descriptions express the perception of an internal relation. So
what about these just-mentioned aspect-dawning experiences?
It is striking that here we become ambivalent, that we are unlikely to see
how to read “internal relation” into every one of these quite diverse aspect-
dawning experiences. But it is also striking that our ambivalence is produced
by the very examples Wittgenstein lays before us. And that, for me, argues
against a strong reading of his use of “internal relation” in describing aspect-
dawning experiences at PI 212a. Call it rather a ﬁgure, or a trope, for those
experiences. By identifyingWittgenstein’s use of “internal relation” here as a
ﬁgure of speech, I am denying that it is meant to denote a connection that is
established or grounded by anything beyond the experience of connection
itself—established or grounded, for example, by what Stephen Mulhall
calls “conceptual or grammatical structures.”27 Said otherwise: Although
Wittgenstein’s use of “internal relation,” from the Tractatus on, may have
the appearance of describing the structuredness of language (whether
26 “In the end I say ‘Now it’s right’, or ‘Now at last it’s a march’, ‘Now at last it’s a dance’. –The
same tone of voice expresses the dawning of an aspect.”
27 Stephen Mulhall, On Being in the World: Wittgenstein and Heidegger on Seeing Aspects (London:
Routledge, 1990), 131 (Mulhall 1990). The entire sentence runs: “In thus perceiving the
applicability of a certain system of concepts, one perceives a relation between the object and
those objects to which that set of concepts is also applicable; and since this relation has been
established via conceptual or grammatical structures, it can validly be called an internal relation—
one pertaining to the essence or identity of the relata.”
In his later exchange with Steven Aﬀeldt, Mulhall continues to describe himself as “committed
to the idea that rules and their applications are internally related”; see Mulhall 1998, 39.
Mulhall’s later discussions of aspect-seeing can be read as moderating this position somewhat;
see, for example, Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), especially 179–82 (Mulhall 2001).
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inﬂected as logic or as grammar), it is, in fact, nomore than standing in for or
occupying the place of its mystery.
To underwrite this claim, I begin by noting that “internal relation”
appears nowhere else in the Investigations, and that Wittgenstein nowhere
tries to justify this singular invocation of the term despite its frequent,
signiﬁcant, and ultimately mysterious appearances in the Tractatus.28 The
sense that Wittgenstein gives to “internal relation” in the Tractatus is
expressed at TLP 4.123:29
A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess
it. (This shade of blue and that one stand, eo ipso, in the internal relation
of lighter to darker. It is unthinkable that these two objects should not
stand in this relation.)
As is thematic throughout Wittgenstein’s early text, the nature of the
unthinkable is that it is unsayable: “It would be just as nonsensical to
assert that a proposition had a formal property [that a pair of proposi-
tions had an internal relation] as to deny it” (TLP 4.124). Instead, an
internal relation between possible states of aﬀairs “expresses itself”
through an internal relation between the representing propositions
(TLP 4.125), and their internal relation likewise “expresses itself,” is
not something we can express, not something our words can say (TLP
4.121); it needs to be seen.
For the early Wittgenstein, then, the Tractarian remarks including the
phrase “internal relation” are to be understood according to that interpretive
stance that readers of the Tractatus are asked to take toward the book
as a whole: they are to be surmounted, transcended, ﬁnally done without
28 See TLP 4.014, 4.122–4.125, 5.131, 5.2–5.232.
29 This apparent sense of “internal relation” is in line with that which generates the turn-of-the-
last-century debate between idealists and their opponents over the existence and extent of
internal relations. For an overview of the positions and arguments in this debate, see Richard
Rorty, “Relations, Internal and External,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York:
Macmillan, 1967), 7:125–33 (Rorty 1967). For a summary of how a more recent debate
over internal relations plays out in conﬂicting interpretations of the Tractatus, see Marie
McGinn, “Wittgenstein and Internal Relations,” European Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 4
(2010): 495–509 (McGinn 2010).
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(TLP 6.54; Emiliani 2003; Koeth 2003; Krebs 2001; Mounce 2003;
Proops 2001; Read and Deans 2003; Vilhauer 2003).30 It is thus inexplic-
able why readers of Wittgenstein not only persist in reading the conven-
tional philosopher’s sense of “internal relation” into Wittgenstein’s use of
the term in the Tractatus but adopt that expression and that sense in
explicating the meaning of “grammar” in the Investigations—despite, as I
say, the all but complete nonappearance of the term “internal relation” in
that work.31 Thus we seem to have two interpretive options in reading this
phrase in the Investigations: either “internal relation” now says something, or
it still says nothing. We also have two, parallel interpretive options in
understanding Wittgenstein’s elucidative purpose in adopting this phrase
in describing the dawning of an aspect: either he is saying whatever one now
imagines “internal relation” says—something that Stephen Mulhall, P. M.
S. Hacker, and others imagine Wittgenstein’s notion of “grammar” says—
or he is still saying something that “internal relation” cannot say—which is
why, since this is the option I opt for, I speak of its being used as a ﬁgure or
trope. Which option one adopts will depend ultimately on what one takes
the perception of an internal relation in the dawning of an aspect to turn
on: something underlying the fact of human commonality (as Mulhall and
Hacker would say), or (as I say) something suggestive of the provisionalness
of human commonality.
Let me follow Mulhall’s and Hacker’s reading of Wittgenstein as far as
I can. Imagine that Wittgenstein in PI 212a is using “internal relation”
30 The distinction between the something that Wittgenstein says with the words of the Tractatus and
the nothing that is said by those words was proposed in the late 80s by Cora Diamond and James
Conant and has been developed by others since. For a sampling of this so-called “resolute” reading of
Wittgenstein’s early work, see Conant’s “Throwing Away the Top of the Ladder,”The Yale Review 79
(Spring 1990): 338–64 (Conant 1990); The New Wittgenstein, ed. Alice Crary and Rupert Read
(London andNew York: Routledge, 2000) (Crary and Read 2000); articles by Victor J. Krebs and Ian
Proops in European Journal of Philosophy 9:3 (December 2001); articles by John Koethe, Alberto
Emiliani, and Ben Vilhauer (with replies by Rupert Read & Rob Deans and by H. O. Mounce) in
Philosophical Investigations 26:3 (July 2003); and McGinn 2010.
31 P. M. S. Hacker is the most inﬂuential representative of this practice. See his Insight and Illusion:
Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 118–19,
203, 249–50, 269, 334 (Hacker 1986). Mulhall, for whom Hacker served as both supervisor and
example (Mulhall 1990, 5), follows this practice.
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(as what one “sees” in the dawning of an aspect) somehow literally, or as
shorthand for something like “logical connection” or “grammatical connec-
tion.” And consider a relatively unambiguous case in which one might be
inclined to speak of an internal relation, or at any rate of a close similarity or
likeness,32 between two objects—for instance, the relation between ellipse
and circle.What leads one to speak of an internal relation between the ellipse
and the circle? One might say any number of things: that ellipses and circles
are both round (or anyway, curved); that they are both conic sections, where
the circle is “the limiting case” of a series of ellipses that we imagine cut from
a single cone; that they have similar equations, where the equation for a circle
is again a sort of limiting or simpliﬁed version of the equation for an ellipse;
that both circles and ellipses work particularly well for the shape of the lip of
a coﬀee cup, though ellipsoidal cups become problematic the more the lip of
the cup is, as we say, ﬂattened; and that they look a lot alike. If I now proceed
to remind us of the various occasions on which we say that something is
“internal” (a clock, a combustion engine, evidence, an exile, friction, a
rhyme, revenue, . . . ) and conclude that all of these and similar things we
say and do are what we go on in calling the relation between circles and
ellipses (somehow “literally”) an internal relation, I would be appealing to
what we call grammatical remarks. And I might explain my appeal by noting
that Wittgenstein says, “Essence is expressed by grammar” and “Grammar
tells what kind of object anything is” (PI §§371, 373). Is such an appeal
successful in determining this relation between ellipse and circle once and for
all? In what sense do we go on what we say and do in seeing a relation or
connection between things?
To raise this last question is not to refuse to acknowledge that one
among the things we say and do is call some of the things we see by the
32Garth Hallett suggests that “Likeness between two things (as opposed, say, to their spatial
proximity) is a paradigm example [of an internal relation]”; see A Companion to Wittgenstein’s
“Philosophical Investigations” (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), 698 (Hallett 1977).
And he reminds us that “the example W. used to illustrate ‘noting an aspect’ was: ‘I see the likeness
between these two faces’” (ibid.; cf. PI 193a). But I question whether the later Wittgenstein
intends the concept of “likeness” to give “internal relation” the sort of deﬁnitional precision that
Hallett’s talk of a paradigm example suggests. (It is telling of Hallett’s view that he renders “Ich
sehe eine Ähnlichkeit” as “I see the likeness,” not “I see a likeness.”)
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same name (chairs, for example, or rabbits). I am not denying that, to
put it formulaically, perceptual connections are linguistic connections.
My seeing two chairs before me and my calling them both chairs (though
they are not one and the same, nor need they be two alike), my hearing
singing on two diﬀerent occasions and my saying of each that it is singing
I hear (though the songs, the singers, . . . are diﬀerent) are, I want to say, facts
or achievements on the same level. The thought that in speaking I give form
to a world that I might have imagined myself merely to be describing is one
whose impact has been registered by philosophers as diverse as Kant (in the
premise of his transcendental standpoint) and Nietzsche (in the surmise that
truths are illusions whose illusoriness we have forgotten, proﬀered in the
early essay “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense”).33 What I am
denying is that the appeal to grammar is meant to, or can, remove the natural
anxiety or unease one may feel when philosophizing about the role of
judgment in our everyday use of language—for example, in our attribution
of a relation or connection between things. If the appeal to grammar could
remove that unease, then Wittgenstein’s perspicuous representation of our
grammar really would—indeed must—produce understanding, show that
the connecting links (e.g., between the question “Can I know another’s
pain?” and the ways we ordinarily respond, or fail to respond, to another’s
pain) are indubitable requirements of meaningful speech and thought. But if
establishing connecting links is not a feature of our grammar—as the later
Wittgenstein comes to believe it is not—then a perspicuous representation of
that grammar cannot establish them either, and thusmaywell fail to produce
understanding, despite its success at conveying language’s evident systema-
ticity and normativity. For what Wittgenstein thinks we need to understand
is not, simply and ﬁnally, the systematicity and normativity of language.
What requires understanding is what one might call the musicality of
grammar: the recognition that grammatical connections, despite their sys-
tematicity and normativity, are formed and held together by nothing more
than our continuing individual judgments, the individual occasions of our
33 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” in Raymond Geuss and
Ronald Speirs, ed., The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), 139–53 (Nietzsche 1999).
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engagement with language—just as, despite the disarming delights of
music’s systematic structures, nothing forms and holds together, nothing
makes understandable, this musical passage if we do not or cannot make the
connections in the particular occasions of our hearing it.34
Wittgenstein’s despair over the impossibility of saying one word about
all that music has meant in his life reﬂects, among other things we cannot
hope to fathom, his sense that his book cannot do justice to this lesson,
essentially the lesson of aesthetic judgments—at least for someone who,
like Wittgenstein, ﬁnds that an aesthetic impression can be indescribable
(LC 37) and yet produce conviction, and so model that everything and
nothing which stands behind whatever sense one’s words can convey.
Wittgenstein wrote, in the same year in which he articulated his method
as one of perspicuous representation: “The inexpressible (what I ﬁnd
enigmatic & cannot express) perhaps provides the background, against
which whatever I was able to express acquires meaning” (CV 23g). These
words can seem to, and in a sense do, answer Wittgenstein’s question to
Drury (“How then can I hope to be understood?”). But despair over a
failure to do justice to an understanding is not despair over a failure to
express anything at all. In his remark to Drury, Wittgenstein’s despair
follows from an awareness that the words needed to convey philosophical
understanding do not function within a calculus.35 And it expresses the
awareness that philosophical clarity arrives not like the solution to a
jigsaw puzzle—which, no matter how much its construction demands
of me, everyone immediately recognizes is the solution—but like the
wording of an aesthetic perception, with its peculiar balance of obvious-
ness and opacity, of tenacity and fragility.
34 For an insightful study of the experience of connectedness in music, see Jerrold Levinson,Music
in the Moment (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997) (Levinson 1997).
35 I ﬁnd various illuminating permutations of this thought in Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein and the
Possibility of Discourse, ed. D. Z. Phillips (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) (Rhees
1998). I note two diﬀerences in Rhees’s presentation of this thought: (1) Rhees’s insistence that
“speaking is not functioning within a calculus” is articulated in the domain of “saying some-
thing” in general rather than in the domain of philosophical writing and speech (though I am not
opposed to Rhees’s broader, and so somewhat diﬀerent, use of that disanalogy); (2) Rhees tends to
argue that this awareness is one that the later Wittgenstein continued to miss. Here my disagree-
ment with Rhees is predicted, and possibly shared, by D. Z. Phillips (ibid., 19).
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1.4 Addendum: Aspect-Seeing and Giving
Voice to Connections
I ought to address an objection to my claim that aesthetic judgment is
Wittgenstein’s model for understanding the way in which appeals to
grammar clarify philosophical confusions. For surely, someone might
say, the relation or connection that I see between Jastrow’s duck-rabbit
and actual (pictures of) rabbits does not cause me the slightest unease;
after all, there is a diﬀerence between seeing an aspect and having an
hallucination of one! When I say, standing before the duck-rabbit, “Now
it’s a rabbit!”, my expression has some implications for the world beyond
me, something beyond conveying how things are with me (as when I cry
“Ouch!”). Even if no one should happen to see what I see, for my
expression to be the expression of the dawning of an aspect it must be
possible for me to justify my expression, to make clear to others that
what I see is not an hallucination, a dream, a phantasm, . . .And on
Mulhall’s reading of Wittgenstein, that means giving voice to a percep-
tion that is established via conceptual or grammatical structures: “it must
be possible for us to justify how we go on, and as Wittgenstein tells us [at
PI §265] ‘justiﬁcation consists in appealing to something independent’
of that which is being justiﬁed” (Mulhall 1998, 39).
Noting, but putting aside for the moment, the sound of desperation in
“it must be possible for us to justify how we go on”—a remark easier to
imagine voiced by one of Wittgenstein’s interlocutors than in defense of
his developed view—I have not meant to deny that “justiﬁcation consists
in appealing to something independent.”We would not call it “justiﬁca-
tion”were someone to say, for example, “I know that ‘Now it’s a rabbit’ is
true because the aspect I see matches my (private) image for ‘rabbit’.” But
the confusion that has taken hold in this objection lies in the thought that
“justiﬁcation” implies an appeal to something beyond one’s present
voicing of the connections one sees. What sustains the error is the
thought that any attempt at justiﬁcation that is not an appeal beyond
one’s present voicing of connections is an appeal to something private,
and so participates in the delusion of a private language. Or else (and this
is more the force of Mulhall’s remark in its context) it is an appeal to
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something made up on the spot, and so misconstrues the grammar of
“justiﬁcation.”
To imagine a diﬀerent alternative, and one we have been prepared for,
consider Wittgenstein’s description of how one justiﬁes the way one plays
a musical passage, as discussed late in The Brown Book:
—“But surely when you play [a tune that has made its full impression on
you] you don’t play it anyhow, you play it in this particular way, making a
crescendo here, a diminuendo there, a caesura in this place, etc.”—
Precisely, and that’s all I can say about it, or may be all that I can say
about it. For in certain cases I can justify, explain the particular expression
with which I play it by a comparison, as when I say “At this point of the
theme, there is, as it were, a colon,” or “This is, as it were, the answer to
what came before,” etc. (This, by the way, shows what a ‘justiﬁcation’ and
an ‘explanation’ in aesthetics is like.) (BB 1969: 166)
For these words to be a justiﬁcation (or a “justiﬁcation,” if that is
diﬀerent) it is still necessary that the other person hear it, hear the
point of my making these and other comparisons. There is no further
course of appeal to show that what is called for at this juncture of the
tune is as it were a colon, or an answer to what came before, or an
exhalation, or less a repetition than a remembrance. Naturally, I may
ﬁnd, as in other contexts where I employ a ﬁgurative or secondary use of
words, that I need to explain, and so in a sense can “go on” to appeal to,
the ordinary or primary use of “colon,” “answer,” “exhale,” “remem-
ber.”36 But when I do go on in that way—however I justify my thinking
that I need to go on in that way, with this person—the things I then say
are not justiﬁed by something strictly beyond me, as modeled in the
notion of grammar as a framework, but “justiﬁed” by my continuing to
make the connections I do, in the hope—a hope typically but not
everywhere borne out—that the other will make them, too.
36Cf. CV 59d: “If I say e.g.: it’s as if here a conclusion were being drawn, or, as if here something were
being conﬁrmed, or, as if this were a reply to what came earlier,—then the way I understand it clearly
presupposes familiarity with conclusions, conﬁrmations, replies, etc.”
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That is the model of justiﬁcation found throughout Wittgenstein’s
later work in his remarks on justiﬁcation in aesthetics. By weighing this
aesthetic dimension of Wittgenstein’s later writings, one can come to see
(or hear) that the form of justiﬁcation found in our conversations about
art reveals in bald form our condition, whenever we give voice to (verbal,
visual, aural) connections.
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